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Extremism in Poiesis and Praxis: Hugh MacDiarmid, 
Malcolm X, and Barry Goldwater, Oxford 1964 
Corey Gibson 
Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice; moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue. 
—Oxford Union Debate, December 3, 1964[1] 
 
This motion was adapted from Barry Goldwater’s speech at the Republican National Convention 
on July 16, 1964, in which he accepted the party’s presidential nomination. One month after 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s landslide victory over the firebrand conservative, the motion was debated in 
an altogether different though no less performative context. Amongst those speaking for the 
motion at the Oxford Union were two unlikely bedfellows: the poet, Hugh MacDiarmid, an 
avant-gardist in the cultural sphere and vanguardist in the political, outspoken Scottish 
nationalist, and professed communist ideologue, and the political activist and cultural icon, 
Malcolm X, former Nation of Islam minister, revolutionary black nationalist, and, increasingly 
during this period, anti-colonial internationalist.[2] Just a few minutes before midnight the motion 
they had supported was defeated 228 votes to 137. Nevertheless, in MacDiarmid’s thirteen 
minutes of diverse, emphatic aphorisms, and in Malcolm X’s thirty minutes of careful exposition 
on the depth and breadth of global injustice, the poet and the activist revealed a common cultural-
political agenda. 
Through close analysis of the respective speeches, the motion and its resonances, and thorough 
cultural and political contextualization, this article identifies a unique opportunity in this televised 
debate: to imagine a new way in which modernist avant-gardism and political vanguardism of the 
interwar period might relate to the Civil Rights Movement, anti-colonial struggles, and human 
rights discourses emergent in the early 1960s. While both MacDiarmid and Malcolm X make for 
controversial representatives of these respective cultural-historical moments, their fleeting and 
entirely arbitrary allegiance during this singular event in Oxford reveals that in their defense of 
“extremism” they each rejected the conventional ontologies of political action, supplanting ends 
with pure means. This focus on process and commitment would allow them, at least in rhetorical 
terms, to advocate for a revolutionary political consciousness while rejecting “moderation” for its 
perceived cynicism and instrumentalism, and for the so-called “common sense” arguments that 
are frequently invoked in support of it. 
The debate has attracted substantial attention among Malcolm X scholars, particularly with 
respect to the development of the activist’s worldview in these final months of his life. However, 
MacDiarmid scholars, and critical treatments of the afterlives of modernist thought more 
generally, have not made much of the event. This article does not make great claims for the 
significance of the debate in understanding MacDiarmid’s political views in isolation; rather, it 
claims that this event, and others like it—public debates and the displays of virtuosic oratory they 
invite—might provide a new and distinct forum for examining the afterlives of the interwar 
avant-garde, in this case, in the crucible of an applied and concrete political discourse. An 
additional point of departure it promotes is the public debate as an underexplored but valuable 
resource that cultural critics might look to in reconciling ideological and aesthetic precepts with 
public discourse. Modernist studies, in particular, has long dealt with the rift between 
compositional sophistication and popular reception. Furthermore, the familiar notion of literature 
as intellectual speech-act can be said to invite its inverse: the intellectual speech-act as literature. 
The subject of this article provides a test-case for these critical frameworks. 
The most striking feature of this particular event is its unique convergence of personalities, 
ideologies, and setting: the motion from a Cold Warrior Senator defended by a black nationalist 
and a Scottish communist, in front of an audience made up largely of ascendant UK elites, in an 
establishment institution historically complicit in British colonialism, broadcast by the BBC for a 
public recovering from a general election marked by divisive campaigns on immigration and 
race. By isolating this event, we might strike upon connections between the artist and the activist 
as understood by two figures who dedicated enormous efforts to understanding the respective 
revolutionary potentialities embodied by those vocations. This proximity of purpose can help us 
to understand MacDiarmid’s own conceptualization of the typically modernistic turn from grand 
historical ends (in political or poetical terms), towards means as non-relational and self-
contained. It can also help us to map out one convergence between this modernist scepticism 
towards the confluence of actions and ideals, and the immanence of active political struggles in 
the post-war era (from Harlem to central Africa). How, in this context, can revolutionary strategy 
conceived in abstract and delivered in aphorism (MacDiarmid), and that born of personal 
hardship, racial cosmology, and the experience of political and cultural leadership (Malcolm X) 
align? And why is it that this alliance is not concerned with clear or common definitions of 
“liberty” or “justice”? 
Arguing on the side of the poet and the activist was Eric Anthony Abrahams, the outgoing 
President of the Union. Opposing the motion were Christie Davies, president of the Cambridge 
Union; Humphry Berkeley, at that time Conservative Member of Parliament for Lancaster; and 
Lord Stoneham, a Labour Peer. This thoroughly establishment opposition appealed to an appetite 
for measured, dispassionate compromise in place of the seemingly instinctive and unthinking 
absolutism of the zealots. Their approach was bolstered by the proponents’ reputations for 
hyperbole. Consider MacDiarmid’s assurances that he “would sacrifice a million people any day 
for one immortal lyric,” and Malcolm X’s notorious response to news of John F. Kennedy’s 
assassination: “a case of ‘the chickens coming home to roost.’”[3] It was against this backdrop 
that both Berkeley and Stoneham were able to invoke the pragmatism of political and 
parliamentary experience in contrast to the remit of artistic vision, civic resistance, or full-blown 
revolution. In his opening salvo, Berkeley set out to caricature the unholy alliance with which he 
was faced: 
And I must say to this house, Mr. President, that any motion that can unite an apostle of racial 
absolutism with an apostle of economic absolutism must, in my view, clearly be wrong [applause 
and laughter]. Particularly when they are joined together to defend a thesis propounded by a man 
who voted both against civil rights and anything remotely suggestive of socialism. This seems to 
me to take cynicism almost to the point of absurdity. 
 
MacDiarmid and Malcolm X were, however, careful not to allow the integrity of their arguments 
to be undermined by emotive pleas, nor rendered “academic” through ideological (or, simply 
logical) abstraction. In avoiding the polar risks of these conventional modes of persuasion—
pathos and logos—they sought out a line of argument characterised by a wilful elevation of 
dissent over agreement and commitment over compromise. Their speeches were at once violent, 
droll, and even metaphysical. They gave wide berth to the prescribed roles of the over-earnest, 
shirt-rending sentimentalist and the dispassionate, conjectural dialectician, and instead deployed a 
subtle argumentation by ethos—that is, by the particular authority afforded by the perceived 
duties, and insights, of the artist and the activist. They thereby performed in debate a confluence 
of revolutionary strategy, though they spoke with the authority of different types of social actors, 
through the accumulated weight of divergent intellectual and political traditions, and in voices 
that found their form and ideation in different struggles. 
The Speakers in 1964 
In the context of the political mainstream of the mid-1960s, to be comfortable with the term 
“extremism” was to challenge perfectly legitimate feelings of fear and anxiety with solutions that 
spoke to sheer will and obstinacy. The scale of Goldwater’s defeat in 1964 was due in large part 
to the ubiquity of this perspective. A climate of “hate” was said to have killed Kennedy, and even 
Republican commentators took to comparing Goldwaterites with groups such as the Nation of 
Islam (NOI), to which Malcolm X had belonged. The comparison was not simply a rhetorical 
flourish; it was substantiated by policy—specifically, a common rejection of racial integration. 
This dynamic of unlikely associations seems comparable to Marcus Garvey’s negotiations with 
Edward Young Clarke of the Ku Klux Klan in 1922, and the NOI’s with George Lincoln 
Rockwell of the American Nazi Party in 1961.[4] Perhaps Garvey and the NOI thought it would 
easier to speak in clear terms with murderous reactionaries than with those who acknowledged 
the injustices their communities strained against, but did not recognize the imperative of action. 
These “extreme” antagonists, by circumventing the hypocrisy and Machiavellian maneuvering of 
professed “moderates,” were able to exercise a kind of positional parallelism. MacDiarmid and 
Malcolm X would adapt and develop this notion in their Oxford speeches. 
Malcolm X had broken publicly with the NOI and with the teachings of its prophet, Elijah 
Mohammed, in March of 1964. He established his Pan-Africanist “Organization of Afro-
American Unity” (OAAU) in affiliation with the anti-colonial Organisation of African Unity (a 
precursor to the African Union) in June of that year. Following his pilgrimage to Mecca, and 
numerous visits with spiritual and political leaders across Africa and the Middle East, Malcolm X 
came to reject many of his former positions, and now embraced an emphatically internationalist 
perspective, binding the global anti-colonial struggle to domestic movements for racial equality, 
and even incorporating the language of contemporary socialist and anti-capitalist 
movements.[5] As he discarded the eccentric cosmology of the NOI and embraced orthodox 
Islam, his political worldview became more secular; his religious work found its focus outside of 
the OAAU, in the Muslim Mosque Incorporated (MMI, est. 1964). The evolution in Malcolm X’s 
thought is famously encapsulated in an episode recalled in the Autobiography, in which he comes 
to regret his response to an over-eager privileged white student’s offer of solidarity and support: 
“‘What can I do?’ she exclaimed. I told her, ‘Nothing’” (394, emphasis in original). Some years 
later, wishing that he might contact this student and revise his answer, he reflected: “Let sincere 
whites go and teach non-violence to white people!” (496). In recent publications marking the 
fiftieth anniversary of the debate, historians have distinguished the Oxford Union speech as the 
apogee of Malcolm X’s political thought, in what were to be the final months of his life.[6] He 
would be assassinated at the hands of NOI agents in New York on February 21, 1965. 
The Oxford Union debate has been awarded less prominence among MacDiarmid scholars. In 
Alan Bold’s biography it features as only one among a long series of public engagements 
attended by the “grand old man of Scottish letters” in the mid-1960s.[7] By 1964, MacDiarmid 
had long since produced the great bulk of his poetic corpus, and his most celebrated works had 
been published more than thirty years previous. Associated primarily with the interwar Scottish 
literary renaissance, and with a program of cultural nationalism conceived to resist the 
ascendency of the English literary canon, reconnecting with contemporary European innovations 
in terms of literary form, intellectual ideas and the purposive nature of art, and with the frontiers 
of philosophic and scientific enquiry, in 1964 MacDiarmid was the figurehead of a cultural-
historical moment that seemed to an increasing number of the younger generation of writers long 
outmoded. His collected works were being collated, his early lyrics were increasingly 
anthologized, and his work won the recognition of the literary establishment in receiving the 
Foyle Prize in 1963. Given his emeritus status, his standing in literary history was increasingly 
out of his control, more the subject of scholarly monographs, and broader academic discourses. 
This is not to suggest that these critical works were overwhelming in number, weight, or extent, 
or that MacDiarmid has always enjoyed an uncontested place in the modernist canon, but that 
discussion had started to proceed without him in this period. MacDiarmid’s appetite for public 
controversy was, however, unabated. He had attacked the emergent generation of Scottish writers 
at the 1962 Edinburgh International Writers’ Conference for their cosmopolitanism and their 
failure to produce material of sufficient political heft. In the few months preceding the Oxford 
debate he had engaged in a protracted assault on the popular folk revival in the opinion pages of 
the Scotsman newspaper.[8] In October, MacDiarmid had stood in the UK general election as the 
Communist candidate for Kinross and West Perthshire in opposition to the sitting Prime Minister, 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Polling only 127 votes (fewer even than the 137 at the Oxford debate), 
he went on to take Douglas-Home to Election Court under the Representation of the People Act 
(1949), ostensibly for having procured more exposure for his platform on BBC broadcasts than 
was made available to the poet-politician.[9] MacDiarmid relished any opportunity to vex the 
British Establishment, to puncture the orthodoxies of conventional political posturing and 
propriety, and to transgress any limiting conceptions of the public life of the artist. 
In December 1964, therefore, the poet-contrarian and the activist-orator were set on inverse 
career trajectories. While both would establish lasting legacies, MacDiarmid was rearticulating a 
familiar vision of the committed artist that could easily be taken as retrospective justification for 
a lifetime’s work; Malcolm X was still seeking out the correct expression for a nascent political-
ethical worldview. Both men had been under the surveillance of their respective nations’ Security 
Services, and both had evolved publicly in their respective political and spiritual allegiances: 
MacDiarmid’s early interest in Fascism gave way to his idiosyncratic interpretations of 
communist doctrine; Malcolm X’s disillusionment with the NOI and his embrace of Sunni Islam 
was widely reported, as were his efforts to manage a tabloid reputation as the “angriest Negro in 
America” (Autobiography, 483). At the Oxford Union, Berkeley took great pleasure in 
elaborating on his opponents’ contrivances: 
The two visiting proposing speakers tonight have at least one thing in common, neither is 
appearing under his own name. One has a pseudonym which has apparently been plundered 
from the Gaelic poets, and another has a pseudonym which has apparently . . . been 
plagiarized from the works of Kafka. 
 
The comparison is trite given the motivations behind these assumed names—one, admittedly, part 
of a deliberate poetical and political persona, but the other a marker for an unknowable heritage, 
lost to the violence of colonialism and slavery. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worthy of reflection 
that neither Christopher Murray Grieve nor Malcolm Little would likely have been invited to the 
Union, and that in both cases, their public personae played a calculated role in the pursuit of a 
politico-cultural agenda.[10] 
The debate at which they appeared has been long remembered in the Oxford Union itself—a 
fiftieth anniversary debate in 2014 featured Cornell West and Angela Davis speaking for the 
same motion.[11] And while it has come to represent the best of the Oxford Union in its 
timeliness, its timelessness, and its virtuoso performances, for the poet and the activist it was 
neither a familiar nor a comfortable forum for debate. In a letter dated a few days after the event 
MacDiarmid wrote of the “Tories” he and Malcolm X had faced, and of the student body: “quite 
incredibly callow: all they want on such occasions is plenty of giggles.”[12] The recordings of the 
debate do nothing to dispel the Union’s reputation for pomp and ceremony, haughtiness and self-
satisfaction. We might speculate that this culture of self-assurance comes with the promise of 
accession to a long-established elite, but to these particular speakers it no doubt seemed a 
concentrated site of the kinds of assumptions and conventions against which they had struggled in 
contemporary literary and political cultures.[13] Indeed, the characteristic in-jokes and 
superciliousness of the Union contrasted with the poet’s defiantly dour tone, and the activist’s 
relaxed and sometimes comedic self-awareness. Each of their approaches might readily be 
explained by any number of factors: the symbolism of the Union as a training ground for the 
House of Commons (a so-called “playground of power”), the privilege they observed in the 
audience (“members only”), or the great opportunity afforded by the BBC’s coverage to 
broadcast their diagnoses and cures for modernity’s maladies. This said, in MacDiarmid’s 
aloofness, and Malcolm X’s calm, plain-spoken engagement with the other speakers, each 
conveyed that the familiar thrust and parry of the institution was beneath them, unworthy of their 
arguments. Their attacks would not be ad hominem, nor would they rely on puns, nor couch their 
criticisms in perfunctory posturing. The stance they assumed in relation to “extremism” would 
have appeared insincere and the purpose of their excoriating tone would have been lost, had they 
conceded to any of these performative conventions. 
The Motion 
On the surface, the motion debated at Oxford employs a common rhetorical device in its adoption 
of the terms of an ideology it is designed to discredit. In this case, two pillars of the liberal 
tradition, liberty and justice, are at once left undefined and placed beyond reproach. This might 
give us some clue as to the potency of the statement and the expansive discursive possibilities it 
invites, not least when its discussants move beyond a surface reading and into context, ideation, 
application, and ethics. “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice; moderation in the pursuit 
of justice is no virtue” is a deceptive apophthegm. Its syntactical structure affects a self-contained 
and self-evident kind of logic that does not withstand much scrutiny. It approximates a 
chiasmus—a device familiar to Malcolm X: “We didn’t land on Plymouth Rock; the Rock was 
landed on us.”[14] However, the implied formal symmetry of the statement is not substantiated. 
The object is changed from liberty to justice. Furthermore, the negative affirmations 
(no vice; no virtue) only tell us what these combinations of means and ends are not. They do not 
necessarily imply the inverse (that extremism in defense of liberty is virtuous). The flow of the 
maxim, then, disguises its complexity and evades the burden of definition that must come with 
any pronouncement on liberty and its costs. John F. Kennedy’s celebrated chiasmus, “Ask not 
what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country,” described the 
relationship between two variables.[15] Goldwater’s contains six: extremism, moderation, liberty, 
justice, virtue, and vice. The rhetorical effect of the chiastic structure is to suggest that all tenets 
of the underlying argument have been considered (that is, all two sides). But given the variety of 
abstract concepts and syntactical ambiguity, Goldwater’s notorious aphorism falls far short of its 
implied exhaustiveness. If glossed, it reads as an elegant yet violent dismissal of nuance, though 
it neglects to replace that nuance with the kind of readily graspable message that so-often 
characterizes reactionary political discourse. It remains a puzzle. 
The implied parallelism of the two halves of the statement asks us to set extremism and 
moderation, and vice and virtue, in opposition—that is, only questions of method and merit. 
Liberty and justice can, in different circumstances, be seen as either hostile or harmonious. 
Furthermore, their inclusion introduces ideology to the proposition, even if in equivocal terms. 
Were these ideals removed, those opposing the motion might have made more use of Aristotle’s 
Golden Mean, where virtue is the median between polar vices of excess and deficiency—bravery 
between recklessness and cowardice, for example.[16] However, in Aristotle’s spectra of human 
qualities and their relative intensities is a descriptive formula for behavior, rather than an 
invocation of ends and means. The motion’s implicit claim for principle and steadfastness 
combined with its grammatical and conceptual ambiguity inspired a debate that would not settle 
on its terms or its topic. 
The word “extremist” is usually exonymic. Certainly, it lends itself to rhetorical posturing. It 
dictates the parameters of a given discussion by identifying what lies outside of the accepted 
bounds of reason, morality, or simply proportion. It describes the dynamic between ends and 
means, aims and objectives, strategy and tactics. Any defense of “extremism” therefore, is also an 
implicit acceptance of the often inflexible and unfathomable taxonomies that delineate the 
“moderate” and the “extreme.” In short, it means accepting the parameters of those who would 
adopt the term as a pejorative, and it means explaining why propriety is not the primary metric 
for value or virtue. The criteria for “extremism” went largely undefined at Oxford, though 
examples of “extremism” as violence—both hypothetical and historical—provided applied 
models both for and against the motion. 
During the Oxford Union debate, one recurring stance among the opposition was to emphasize 
subjective perspectives on “liberty” and “justice.” Davies suggested that the motion ought to have 
been adapted to “Extremism in the defense of liberty as defined by me is no vice.” This issue had 
been pre-empted by Abrahams, who offered this definition: “men are free when they regard 
themselves as free.” It follows that “men should have the right to protect what they regard as 
freedom.” Of course, this retreat to a fully devolved freedom leaves the motion open to a 
predictable retort: if every conception of liberty is legitimate, then competing and even 
contradictory liberties must engage in an endless struggle where no authoritative arbitration can 
be exercised. While this might appear to be a familiar dimension of postmodernity—a sweeping 
relativism, or radical de-centering—it finds its expression (through Abrahams) not as part of a 
wry, mocking, or otherwise self-aware pose, but as a severe limitation on the horizons of political 
discourse: to the self and its projections, and no further. Unimaginable horrors can therefore 
remain perfectly defensible according to this reading of Goldwater’s dictum. These arguments do 
not, however, trouble MacDiarmid and Malcolm X. For both, the validation for “extremism” is 
precisely in the fact that it is an untameable yet inevitable historical force. As MacDiarmid puts 
it, “our liberties such as they are, have been hard won, and must be continually re-won if they are 
to be retained, let alone extended.” If this debate is principally about ends and means, they do not 
claim to see a clear path to the ends they have in mind; they only know that all means must 
always be available. In this vein, “by any means necessary” was somewhat of a refrain in 
Malcolm X’s oratory, not just at Oxford. 
In his opening defense of the motion, Abrahams explained that the notoriety of the statement was 
not due to its true meaning, but due to “what was meant when it was said.” However, in the 
course of the debate the intentional fallacy was dispensed with swiftly. The original statement 
might be understood simply as an ill-conceived slight aimed at the “moderate” wing of the GOP 
who had supported Nelson Rockefeller for the presidential nomination and who had decried 
Goldwater and his followers as “extremists.” Goldwater’s opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, his recklessness on Cold War diplomacy, his association with William F. Buckley 
Jr.’s National Review, and his unwillingness to distance himself from the support of Robert W. 
Welch Jr.’s John Birch Society, helped this charge stick. However, in the context of Goldwater’s 
oratorical repertoire, the question of political “extremism” was moot. It was “a synonym, if 
anything, for ‘principle.’”[17] John C. Hammerback describes the rhetorical import of the speech 
itself: “Goldwaterites labeled as extremists had become noble harbingers of the people, 
enlightened resisters of slavish conformity, and brave evangelists of the truth.”[18] In 
Goldwater’s own book, The Conscience of a Conservative (1960), ghost-written by his 
speechwriter L. Brent Bozell, traditional conservative political values were refashioned for a 
younger generation who responded well to call-to-arms rhetoric and the elevation of Freedom, 
Autonomy, and Authenticity as mobilizing watchwords. His was a movement that insisted on its 
mission to “preserve and extend freedom,” taking account of the “whole man,” not only of his 
material well-being but his “spiritual nature,” secure in the knowledge that “to regard man as part 
of an undifferentiated mass is to consign him to ultimate slavery.”[19] This particular strain of 
libertarian conservatism, and this justification for “extremism,” was therefore characterized by an 
irresolvable tension between the atomized demands of individuals, and the prerogative of a 
political philosophy to account for the collective: the whole of man, and not just the whole man. 
Decrying the materialism of the socialist and the economic obsessions of the liberal, Goldwater 
conservatives identified with an ill-defined notion of man’s spiritual dimension, of his place in 
accordance with an always capitalized, and thoroughly elusive, Nature. 
Nevertheless, even Goldwater came to recognize the problem of connotative meaning and sought 
to clarify his position in a letter to Richard Nixon: 
If I were to paraphrase the two sentences in question in the context in which I uttered 
them I would do it by saying that whole-hearted devotion to liberty is unassailable 
and that half-hearted devotion to justice is indefensible. (quoted in Perlstein, Before 
the Storm, 505) 
 
This mitigated version seems to respond more sensitively to the social and geopolitical concerns 
of the day, as well as to the expediency of internal party politics. However, in doing so, it 
removes questions of method and merit entirely, and retreats to “devotion,” a measure of love, 
loyalty, or enthusiasm rather than an instrumental question of means. “Vice” and “virtue” are 
replaced with the “unassailable” and the “indefensible,” qualities that can be readily deployed 
outside of an ethical framework. In short, Goldwater’s professed context results in something 
resembling the following: “It is difficult to argue against fidelity to the ideals of liberty and 
justice.” MacDiarmid and Malcolm X would, I think, have held no truck with the revised version. 
The aspects of the original that made Goldwater vulnerable to criticism—the disarming 
ambiguity and the implied violence—were the very qualities that enlisted the support of the poet 
and the activist.  
Signalling his concern with means over ends, MacDiarmid had no trouble agreeing with a 
statement of general principle without sharing the conceptions of liberty or justice promoted by 
its author. Beyond Goldwater, he gave two further examples at Oxford. First, Kennedy, from his 
inaugural address: “Let every nation know . . . that we shall pay any price, bear any burden . . . 
support any friend or oppose any foe, [in order] to assure the survival and success of 
liberty.”[20] Second, Churchill: “[V]ictory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, 
victory, however hard and long the road may be.”[21] Malcolm X went still further in his 
assessment of Goldwater’s forthrightness: “I have more respect for a man who lets me know 
where he stands, even if he’s wrong, than the one who comes up like an angel and is nothing but 
a devil.” In his Autobiography, he channels Niccolo Machiavelli and Cicero to make a similar 
point: “If it had been Goldwater [who won the 1964 election] . . . the black people would at least 
have known they were dealing with an honestly growling wolf, rather than a fox [Lyndon B. 
Johnson] who could have them half-digested before they even knew what was happening” 
(492).[22] In this sense, MacDiarmid and Malcolm X insist that a statement of general principle 
can be misapplied, or even accurately but reprehensibly applied, and still stand. With Goldwater, 
they hold the hypocrite in common contempt. They oppose those who would outwardly baulk at 
an invocation of ends justifying means, even while they exercise their power only in order to 
sustain it, thereby conceiving power as its own end and dodging the issue.[23] 
Extremism and Revolution 
MacDiarmid’s most commonly cited pronouncement on extremism is also inscribed on his 
headstone. It comes from A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle (1926): 
I’ll ha’e nae hauf-way hoose, but aye be whaur 
Extremes meet—it’s the only way I ken 
To dodge the curst conceit o’ bein’ richt 
That damns the vast majority o’ men.[24] 
 
In these lines his “extremism” encapsulates a philosophical stance. It is, at least in part, an 
expression of his understanding of dialectical materialism. Like other aspects of MacDiarmid’s 
political philosophy, however, it is not easily reconciled with ideological orthodoxies. In the 
context of the poem, and in Oxford, it makes him hostile to the posturing of the middle road, and 
immune to the narrow, short-lived satisfaction of “being right.” After all, this impulse to “be 
right” only leads the “vast majority o’ men” to articulate a provisional, fleeting kind of truth, 
provable under only the most circumscribed conditions. As critics have long understood, 
MacDiarmid’s wilful tone and his professed absolutism is liable to distract us from the creative 
instability and adaptability of his thinking.[25] His dialectic is evocative of Wyndham Lewis’s 
in Blast(1914): 
We start from opposite statements of a chosen world. Set up violent structure 
of adolescent clearness between two extremes. 
We discharge ourselves on both sides. 
We fight first on one side, then on the other. But always for the SAME cause, 
which is neither side or both sides and ours.[26] 
 
The Vorticists’ series of “blessed” and “blasted” phenomena performed a partly satiric function 
with some items listed in both columns and therefore, in some sense, self-cancelling. However, 
the persistent feature of this sequence is the self-referent: “we,” “ours.” Blast claims to be at once 
iconoclastic, disinterested, and thoroughly partisan in its advocacy for the avant-
garde.[27] MacDiarmid shared this conviction, though in his case it made simultaneous claims to 
the terms of Marxist-Leninist vanguardism, venerating the working class for its historical agency: 
“Only by the severest intellectual discipline / Can one of the bourgeois intelligentsia win / Up to 
the level of the proletariat” (“Etika Preobrazhennavo Erosa,” Complete Poems, 407).[28] Where 
Lewis had erected his flamboyant contradictions in violent opposition to Marxism, MacDiarmid 
conceived of his in an effort to imaginatively encapsulate dialectical materialism, though he 
encountered problems in retaining the privileged vantage point of the artist.[29] The result was a 
revolutionary politics and aesthetics that were thoroughly sceptical about the direct influence of 
collectivism or democracy in either field. 
MacDiarmid’s contribution to the Oxford debate began, characteristically, on the offensive: 
[the] doctrine of Moderation in all things seems to me the most abominable, anti-vital 
doctrine that has ever been promulgated in the history of mankind. I prefer to take 
Blake’s dictum, that “the road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom and is the only 
road that does.”[30] 
 
Already it is clear that the poet does not need the provisos of liberty or justice to give grounds for 
his pursuit of the extreme. In the speech that followed, MacDiarmid echoed the compositional 
methods of his own later prose and poetic works, offering up a patchwork of quotations, from the 
Book of Revelation through “The Declaration of Arbroath” (1320) and Mao Zedong All in 
service of a forceful commitment to the role of poetry and the intellectual vanguard in pursuing 
his principal and stated end: the “extension of human consciousness.”[31] Conveniently, it is an 
end without an endpoint. 
Following Berkeley, who had just attacked him as “America’s leading exponent of Apartheid,” 
Malcolm X was launched helpfully into his exposition of the complex of attitudes and 
assumptions that have, over centuries, helped to reaffirm and reify imperialism, racism, and other 
modes of oppression. These factors, so entrenched in the West, and particularly among the 
privileged “type” of which Berkeley was, for him representative, are revealed to have repeatedly 
frustrated moderate, measured efforts to defend liberty and pursue justice. Malcolm X set the 
debate in both its synchronic and diachronic contexts: cumulative histories of oppression and 
discrimination were set against the contemporary realities of the Congo Crisis (with extensive 
reference to the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and US interests in the region) and the nexus 
of struggles—ideological, organisational, rhetorical, constitutional, and legal—associated with 
the US Civil Rights Movement. Malcolm X spoke in more concrete terms than his poet-ally, and 
the range of his historical and contemporary referents, the poignancy of his examples, and the 
precision of his language, mean that his argument gathered force as it revealed a complex 
interplay of personal and geopolitical histories. 
MacDiarmid, like Malcolm X, subscribed to the need for thoroughgoing transformation, though 
his approach was more instrumental, more deliberately reconciled with revolutionary strategy. He 
was insistent on the scientific character of his socialism, distinguishing it from the kind of 
“emotional humanism” he found in traditional liberalism and in the English New Left that had 
emerged after 1956: his was not a fiery Jacobin moralism, but a cool, revolutionary logic 
(MacDiarmid, The Uncanny Scot, 161). If History is a priori amoral it follows that any defense of 
questism can be dismissed as a kind of surrender or dereliction: hopeful notions of “progress” are 
wholly insufficient. In this way, the poet and the activist inverted the predictable critique levelled 
by the moderates, who insisted that their conciliatory approach was validated, and the 
revolutionary approach rendered fantastical, by the constraints of the real world and the 
realpolitik. In this, it is the “moderates” who summon Machiavelli: “the gulf between how one 
should live and how one does live is so wide that a man who neglects what is actually done for 
what should be done moves towards self-destruction rather than self-
preservation.”[32] MacDiarmid and Malcolm X professed to welcome such “self-destruction” if 
that was the cost of holding to what “should be”; the primacy of “self-preservation” was precisely 
the problem. 
Malcolm X articulated a more intuitive notion of collective resistance, through widespread 
education and mobilization. His speech at the Oxford Union took place in precisely the post-NOI 
moment that his thinking is said to have converged with Frantz Fanon’s, especially as represented 
in The Wretched of the Earth(1961).[33] Fanon’s account of the psychological effects of 
colonialism and his proposals for the revolutionary mobilization of the lumpenproletariat in the 
anti-colonial struggle was consistent with Malcolm X’s rejection of the philosophy of 
nonviolence and his disregard for the radical potential of the black bourgeoisie, but it would not 
sit comfortably alongside MacDiarmid’s misinterpretation of the role of the intellectual cadre 
from the traditional Marxist-Leninist line, as one that functions outside of—or even in opposition 
to—the proletariat. This strategic divergence can also be observed at the level of their rhetoric at 
Oxford: the poet made dense modernistic use of literary allusion, and the activist deployed a more 
conversational tone and a non-specialist, even idiomatic lexicon. MacDiarmid was convinced that 
a spearhead of artists and intellectuals would be required to create the imaginative space needed 
to dispel false consciousness. In contrast, Malcolm X performed a role more in the model of 
Antonio Gramsci’s “organic intellectual,” making his appeal from among the great mass of the 
people, showing them their own capacity for revolutionary thought without abstraction. The first 
step in Malcolm X’s activism was to check the hypocrisy embedded in the language of the 
hegemonic system of oppression, exposing the distance between its stated values and its 
practices. The strategic upshot was to reveal that even the kind of “moderation” that leads to 
incremental amelioration of some of the most overtly oppressive practices is tantamount to 
complicity, reinforcing and sustaining systems of power by giving them space to reformulate and 
absorb their structural threats. 
The need for “extremism” was, then, predicated on the false consciousness of the people. For 
MacDiarmid and Malcolm X, threats to liberty and justice were not confined to the most overt 
manifestations of state power but were part of the fabric of socio-political hegemony. 
MacDiarmid reminded his audience that “persecution, bullying, intimidation, humiliation and 
cruelty, are forms of mental violence,” and Malcolm X described the “language of violence” 
spoken by the “racialist.” In doing so, they pre-empted and contextualized the opposition’s 
elision of “extremism” and “violence.” Malcolm X also referred to the use of “extremism” as a 
“label.” If you were known as an “extremist,” all of your behaviour was that of an “extremist,” 
whether or not a given act had anything to do with your political agenda. It is worth noting that 
Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., whose legacy is so often set in contradistinction with that of 
Malcolm X, was also frequently described as “extremist.” Just one week after the Oxford debate 
King was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In his “Letter from Birmingham Jail” (1963), he 
professed to have “gradually gained a measure of satisfaction from the label. . . . [T]he question is 
not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be.” After all “justice too 
long delayed is justice denied.”[34] 
Malcolm X developed his notion of the “label” into an exposition on the apparatus of the 
dominant political ideology, its manipulation of “images,” the propagandist role of the press, and 
the imposition of a universal “yardstick,” or ethical framework, sanctioned by established power. 
Tracing these phenomena in his own reputation, in contemporary coverage of the civil war in 
Congo, and in the political structures of the US, he arrived at the hypocrisy that characterizes, but 
ought to undermine, these forces: 
[The black man is] supposed to sit passively and have no feelings, be nonviolent, 
and love his enemyno matter what kind of attack, verbal or otherwise, he’s supposed 
to take it. But if he stands up and in any way tries to defend himself, [chuckles] then 
he’s an extremist. 
 
MacDiarmid made a similar point when he lamented “the continued confinement of the people of 
these [so-called Christian] countries to a mere earthly eudemonism.” Eudemonism is a system of 
ethics basing moral value on the likelihood of actions generating happiness. It is close to the 
Christian ethics of “love thy neighbour,” and “turn the other cheek,” that were, for Malcolm X, 
simply part of the apparatus of consent: what he called “brainwashing” and MacDiarmid called 
“false consciousness.” To explain the importance of combatting ignorance and apathy among the 
people, the poet called on Mao for a most incisive diagnosis: 
What is the strength of the imperialists? It lies only in the unconsciousness of the 
people. The consciousness of the people is the basic question, not explosives or 
weapons, or atom bombs, but the man who handles them. He is still to be 
educated.[35] 
 
Malcolm X reflected on a similar awakening in his Autobiography: “My homemade education 
gave me, with every additional book that I read, a little bit more sensitivity to the deafness, 
dumbness, and blindness that was afflicting the black man in America” (274). In this context, the 
term “extremism” can be used to delineate those transformative means that have not been 
absorbed, and therefore neutralized, by established power. Both the poet and the activist couched 
their defense of “extremism” in relation to broad historical processes and the need to overturn 
false consciousness of one form or another. Malcolm X and MacDiarmid both advocated unity in 
theory and praxis, and this meant collapsing ends and means into one another. To separate them 
was to allow for the possibility of holding to ideals without pursuing them, or, it was to narrow 
one’s horizons so far as to exclude all action but mere self-preservation. 
Poiesis and Praxis 
Both speakers felt that the “education” or expanded “consciousness” they fostered was in the 
ascendant in 1964. Malcolm X warned that “many people who have been in positions of power in 
the past don’t realise that the centres of power are changing,” and MacDiarmid spoke of recent 
“revolutions, which have changed the balance of world power,” and of ongoing “national 
liberation movements on three continents.” Neither seems to have based his predictions for the 
future, or his revolutionary program for the future, on any sanguine belief in the fixed nature of 
humankind, as Goldwater had in The Conscience of a Conservative. Indeed, MacDiarmid made a 
point of emphasising that the scale of the contemporary historical transformation would 
“profoundly change the whole nature of man.” This said, the impatience with which the poet and 
the activist responded to any talk of ennobling virtues or human nature in promoting 
“moderation,” does not necessarily cast them as the cynics in this contest. It was, after all, their 
opponents who could not imagine a political philosophy that was not formulated in terms of 
compromise between competing interests. MacDiarmid’s call for “transformation” over 
“humanism,” and for “a great human mutation,” was variously articulated with the words of 
Nobel Prize-winning physicist J. J. Thomson, the celebrated neurologist Walter Russell Brain, 
and the industrialist and automotive pioneer Sir Leon Bagrit. A degree of mechanized abstraction 
is, therefore, implied in his vision at Oxford, and this was made explicit in the scientific registers 
of much of his middle-period poetry (for instance “On A Raised Beach” and In Memoriam James 
Joyce). In this formulation, MacDiarmid seems to concede that the revolutionary change required 
might be affected on more than one front; by circumventing as well as confronting the limitations 
of the collective consciousness of the masses. 
MacDiarmid’s promise to avoid the half-way house and “aye be whaur extremes meet” was part 
of an attempt to see the true historical scale of things. In a late interview he explained: 
The variety and the enormity of the world and the infinite possibilities of the human 
mind are such that contradictions are inevitable for anyone who has a certain depth of 
intellectual perception. Only shallow minds fancy that they are being consistent. And 
they can only be consistent within a very narrow ambit. As soon as they endeavour to 
take in the whole . . . they are lost, completely lost.[36] 
 
In the debate, the poet blamed our collective “unconsciousness” for the fact that “our harmonies 
and solutions [are on such] contemptibly narrower a level than the conflicts and tragedies which 
encompass our lives.” Malcolm X reinforced this point: 
The only way one can really determine whether or not extremism in defense of liberty 
is justified is not to approach it as an American, or a European, or an African, or an 
Asian, but as a human being . . . most people usually think in terms of extremism as 
something that’s relative, related to someone whom they know or something that 
they’ve heard of—I don’t think they look upon extremism by itself or all alone. They 
apply it to something. 
 
The need for extremism must be abstracted, protected from contingency and particularized 
circumstances, and taken as a statement of general principle. To demonstrate that it leads to 
contradictions, that its absolutism is dangerous, and to advocate moderation in its place, is 
to apply it to something, and so to neuter it. 
The failure to apply “extremism” to something concrete—a failure MacDiarmid may be found 
guilty of in his speech, though Malcolm X could not—is not equivalent to decoupling it from 
action altogether; rather, it means applying it in ways appropriate to its character. It becomes a 
corrective, perpetually reminding the poet and the activist of the need to confront the ubiquity of 
the structures that demand their active resistance. In the closing portions of their speeches both 
MacDiarmid and Malcolm X set out their commitment to the reconciliation of philosophy and 
praxis, denying their opponents a convenient line of argumentation—that the respective remits of 
poetry and activism do not allow for the mundane tangle of Bismarck’s dictum: politics as the art 
of the possible. In articulating this commitment, each drew from the work of poets they had long 
admired: Malcolm X from Shakespeare, and MacDiarmid from MacDiarmid.[37]In turning to 
poetry they lifted the discourse out of the field of hypothetical and historical thought experiments, 
beyond the applications of stated scenarios, and onto a near-metaphysical level that at once 
contains and transcends these contexts. 
Citing a long discursive poem, “To the Young Poets of the World To-day,” MacDiarmid’s speech 
ended: 
Man can find his own dignity only in action now. 
  
Most people live by a social discipline become intolerably artificial, 
A construction whose only merit is its security; 
They feel that; they feel the pettiness and emptiness of a social form 
Repeated beyond the day of its absolute necessity; 
But they fear the possible chaos that would always threaten those who break 
through a form; 
They are right to fear it—for every creation risks being a destruction 
only; 
Yet as long as there is strength for creation creation must be risked. 
 
This poem had appeared in extract in MacDiarmid’s Lucky Poet (1943), a meandering, dense, and 
heavily intertextual autobiography or “self-study in literature and political ideas.” Under the 
chapter title, “The Ideas Behind My Work,” this excerpt continues at some length (“Wipe out the 
false word ‘humanism’; our art is not to be /Misericordious, toothless, pacifist”), it is also set 
alongside other passages from “Third Hymn to Lenin” (“Our concern is human wholeness”), and 
early drafts of The Kind of Poetry I Want (1961) (“Mine is the antipathy of . . . the doctrinaire to 
the opportunist, / The potential fanatic to the ‘practical man’”).[38] In combination, this series of 
poetic extracts anticipates his later defense of “extremism.” He elaborated at Oxford: “the 
arts know no compromise. The rootlessness and eccentricity of the artist knows no limit. That is 
the only possible model we can take in this matter.” 
Naturally, Malcolm X’s legacy is one caught up in the symbolism of philosophy and action 
reconciled. His Autobiography has been crucial in promoting the story of a life in terms of 
transformations and epiphanies, the gradual acquisition of a dispassionate and penetrating 
diagnostic gaze.[39] As if accounting for this personal resolve as well as for the motion at hand, 
Malcolm X closed his speech with an idiosyncratic reading of Hamlet’s soliloquy: 
“To be or not to be” [pause], he was in doubt about something [laughter]. Whether it 
was nobler in the mind of man to “suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous 
fortune.” Moderation. “Or to take up arms against a sea of troubles, / And, by 
opposing, end them.” And I go for that. If you take up arms, you’ll end it. But if you 
sit around and wait for the one who’s in power to make up his mind that he should 
end it, you’ll be waiting a long time. 
 
With some irony, Malcolm X finds in Hamlet’s words a summary of the dilemma between 
“extremism” and “moderation,” between opposition and sufferance. Of course, the soliloquy 
continues without him: “For who would bear the whips and scorns of time, / Th’oppressor’s 
wrong, the proud man’s contumely, . . . 
Thus conscience does make cowards— 
And thus the native hue of resolution 
Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought, 
And enterprises of great pitch and moment, 
With this regard their currents turn awry, 
And lose the name of action.[40] 
 
MacDiarmid and Malcolm X did not pretend that their commitment to “extremism” is 
unproblematic in application, but they believed that the “name of action” must be retained even if 
it requires some abeyance of foresight. In his speech, MacDiarmid prefigured Malcolm X’s 
Hamlet with these famous lines from James Graham, the first Marquis of Montrose (1612–1650): 
He either fears his Fate too much, 
Or his Deserts are small, 
That dares not put it to the touch, 
To gain or lose it all.[41] 
 
We might speculate on the intended effects of these closing lines from both speakers: one, 
perhaps the single most recognisable passage of English literature, the other, a rather self-
indulgent passage of proclamatory abstracts from MacDiarmid’s later, less successful and less 
accessible “poetry of facts.” Malcolm X’s use of Shakespeare is prefaced with some causal 
posturing (“I read once, passingly, about a man named Shakespeare”), and was perhaps designed 
to taunt the Union audience by interpreting these vaunted lines as a hymn to political 
action.[42] MacDiarmid’s reading, on the other hand, seems to have been deployed to 
demonstrate the confluence of philosophy and praxis his work had long argued for, and to 
reaffirm the role of the poet in reconciling the universal and the particular. 
Though these figures dealt in absolutes, they were comfortable with the mess of contradictions, 
controversies, and contortions that this produced. And they succeeded, in this Oxford Union 
debate, in glimpsing larger processes than those accessible to the champions of compromise, 
diplomacy, and moderation who sat across the chamber. Prompting some mirth, MacDiarmid 
cited his favourite quotation from the Bible, from the Book of Revelation: “because thou art 
neither hot nor cold, but lukewarm, therefore will I spit thee out of my mouth.” As a reflection on 
the duty to seek resolve it sits close to the sense of that aphorism commonly attributed to 
Malcolm X: “if you don’t stand for something, you’ll fall for anything.” 
In the context of global decolonization, the US Civil Rights Movement, the Cold War, and 
escalating conflict in Vietnam, MacDiarmid and Malcolm X demonstrated a common 
understanding of historical processes, and the “extremism” that might be required to intervene on 
their behalf. Though their conceptions of these principles were very different, together they set 
out a more equivocal, less dogmatic case for “extremism” than that their opponents were able to 
construct for “moderation.” The debate transcripts can be read as a performed exploration of the 
relationships between rhetoric and action, and between abstraction and manifestation. 
MacDiarmid’s defense of “extremism” could not have been more abstract; Malcolm X’s could 
not have been more concrete. Their combined referential reach included allusions to, or citations 
from, scripture, Shakespeare, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, American and French Revolutionary 
doctrines, Romantic poetry, Seán O’Casey, Kennedy, Churchill, leading lights in contemporary 
science, and the tabloid press. In combination, therefore, they made an unwilling and perhaps 
unknowing concession to the nascent cultural norms of postmodernity: their performances were 
pointedly self-reflexive, and in their efforts to establish the immutability of their position and the 
myopia of their opponents’, they risked collapsing discrete historical signifiers into one another, 
eliding the distinctions in context that would characterize a conventionally materialist analysis. 
They did not mount a purely rational appeal, nor an emotive one, but they did insist that their 
respective roles, as poet and activist, afforded them perspectives that superseded the myopia that 
conceives of only compromise and concession. 
Extremism was for them necessary, in the mode of W. H. Auden’s “necessary murder.”[43] In 
extremis, the argument goes, extreme responses are apposite. The question that emerges is not 
“should we be extreme?,” rather, we are asked to calmly and deliberately acknowledge the vast 
horizons of such states of extremis. After all, their pervasiveness and their seeming permanence 
surely prompts us to assume a more extreme posture in response, in anticipation, and, perhaps, in 
perpetuity. This constitutes a thorough rejection of the established liberal ontologies of political 
action.[44] In arguing for means without ends, MacDiarmid and Malcolm X refused to situate 
themselves in the discursive landscape sketched out by their opponents (and by the motion): they 
bristled at the condescension that comes with finding common ground in ideals, ends, or great 
causes ill-defined; and they understood the dividing line in the debate to be of more significance 
than a matter of extenuating circumstances, or narrow considerations of tactics and 
instrumentalism. In this sense they anticipated Giorgio Agamben’s notion of the political as a 
kind of perpetual potentiality, a “sphere of pure means,” and they formulated their arguments 
appropriately. Drawing from Aristotle and Marcus Terentius Varro, Agamben sets out 
“production,” (or “poiesis”) as having an end other than itself, and “action” (or “praxis”) as being 
an end in itself.[45] He also states: “Politics is the sphere neither of an end in itself nor of means 
subordinated to an end; rather, it is the sphere of pure mediality without end intended as the field 
of human action and of human thought.”[46] In his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right (1844), Marx elaborates a similar function for “criticism”: “no longer an end in itself, but 
now simply a means. Indignation is its essential pathos, denunciation its principal task.”[47] At 
Oxford, the poet and the activist demanded immediate and utter transformation precisely because 
they acknowledged the structural, phenomenological, and metaphysic distance between the 
present and their projected revolutionary futures. In thinking through the motion’s stated ends, 
these nebulous abstractions, “liberty” and “justice”; through the implicit relativism of 
“extremism” and “moderation”; and through the seemingly categorical ethical binary of “virtue” 
and “vice,” they arrived at commitment in spite of everything and because of everything. It is not 
simply that liberty and justice are endlessly contestable and that “moderation” is little more than 
an inflexible and unproductive rule of thumb. Whatever liberty or justice are, if they are to be 
extended, they cannot be repeatedly diluted and adulterated in the interests of a diminished 
continuance, at least, not in the work of the poet or the political activist. Theirs is a striving 
maintained in full knowledge that, ultimately, it cannot be satisfied. In embracing this endless 
deferral with such intransigence, MacDiarmid and Malcolm X divested themselves of any cover 
that might excuse them of unmet ends, or forgive them for extreme means. At the Oxford Union, 
they asserted that to concede to any less than “by any means necessary” was not only a failure of 
the imagination, but a dereliction of the duty of the poet to create (and destroy), and of the activist 
to advocate (and resist). 
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